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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
This case was instituted by plaintiff in the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-16 
and 17 (1953). The statutory provisions are set out verbatim 
as required by Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals: 
78-31-16. Vacating by court - Grounds.- In any of the 
following cases the court shall, after notice and hearing, 
make an order vacating the award, upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration: 
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud 
or other undue means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrations, or either of them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct 
in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or 
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made. 
Where an award is vacated, and the time within which 
the agreement required the award to be made has not 
expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a 
rehearing by the arbitrators. 
78-31-17. Modification by court - Grounds. - In any of the 
following cases the court shall, after notice and hearing, 
make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the 
application of any party to the arbitration: 
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of 
figures, or an evident mistake in the description of any 
person, thing or property, referred to in the award. 
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(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter 
not submitted to them. 
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form 
not affecting the merits of the controversy. 
The order must modify and correct the award so as to 
effect the intent thereof. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issue presented for appeal is whether plaintiff, under 
the facts established at the trial of this matter, had a 
reasonable basis for instituting this action seeking to vacate 
or modify an arbitration award and, if so, whether defendants' 
Counterclaim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing fails as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Appellants, Paul and Penny Lochhead 
("Lochheads") suffered damage to their residence and personal 
property in a fire on or about October 18, 1983. Respondent, 
American Concept Insurance Company ("American Concept") issued 
a homeowners policy of insurance which was in force at the time 
of the fire. The parties could not agree on the amount of the 
loss and, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract, 
submitted the matter for appraisal. As a result of the 
appraisal procedure, three awards were signed: One for damage 
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to the structure, one for additional living expenses incurred 
by defendants after the loss and one for personal property 
damage. American Concept paid the amounts for the awards for 
damage to the structure and additional living expenses, but 
sought relief in the form of vacation or modification of the 
award for personal property loss pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-31-16 and 78-31-17, respectively, because its appraiser 
told it that the wrong figure had been included in the award. 
Course of Proceedings. Pursuant to the statutory 
procedure, an evidentiary hearing was held on August 27, 1985. 
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses called by 
plaintiff and defendants and receiving the documentary evidence 
submitted by the parties, the trial court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court denied the relief sought by 
American Concept, ruling that it would not go behind the signed 
award absent proof by plaintiff of fraud in the procurement 
thereof. (Transcript at 188) (Findings of Fact If 14) 
Subsequent to American Concept's filing of its Petition to 
Modify or Vacate the Arbitration Award, the Utah Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), which held that there is a bilateral duty 
of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract of 
insurance. Lochheads were allowed to amend their Answer to 
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state a counterclaim for alleged breach by American Concept of 
this duty. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing on, American 
Concept's Petition to Modify or Vacate the Arbitration Award, 
it brought a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of 
Lochheads Counterclaim on the ground that there existed a bona 
fide issue regarding the propriety of the award and that it had 
properly sought review of the award pursuant to Utah law. 
The trial court granted American Concept's Motion for 
Summary Judgment: and Lochheads have appealed. 
Statements of Fact. There is no dispute that Lochheads 
suffered a loss as a result of a fire on or about October 18, 
1983. There is no dispute that American Concept had a 
homeowners policy of insurance in effect at the time of the 
fire. There were three components to Lochheads* claim for 
losses incurred as a result of the fire: structural damage to 
the residence, additional living expenses, and damage to 
personal contents. American Concept paid the total amount of 
Lochheads' additional living expense claim and agreed to 
separate appraisals of the structural loss and the personal 
contents loss, as the parties could not agree on the amount of 
those claims. Subsequent to the appraisal with regard to the 
structural loss, American Concept paid the amount of the 
arbitration award. 
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American Concept retained the services of Donald Laursen to 
represent it with regard to the appraisal of the personal 
property loss. (Tr. at 4). 
Mr. Laursen travelled from his California residence to Salt 
Lake City and began his investigation of the loss on 
January 12, 1984. (Tr. at 6). 
Mr. Laursen spent January 12, 13 and 14 performing a 
thorough examination of the personal property which Lochheads 
claimed to have been lost. (Tr. at 8-18). 
Mr. Laursen prepared a detailed, item-by-item evaluation of 
the loss. (Trial exhibits P2, 3, 4, 5; Tr. at 10-26). 
The total of Mr. Laursen's figures amounted to $50,158.17, 
to which he added $2,884.09 for "sales tax", for a total of 
$53,042.26. (Tr. at 27). 
Mr. Laursen testified that the figure of $53,042.26 was the 
actual amount of the appraisal agreed upon by the appraisers. 
It was this amount, that he understood the Lochheads would 
submit to American Concept as the final amount to be paid for 
personal content loss. However, he had been persuaded to sign 
an award of $61,790.00 on the representation of Dennis Liggett, 
Lochheads' public adjuster, that they wanted to deduct on their 
income tax return the difference between the amount of their 
claim and the amount of the arbitration award as a casualty 
loss and wanted the award as proof of their loss in excess of 
the insurance paid. (Tr. at 27-28). 
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Subsequently, Mr. Laursen learned that Lochheads had 
submitted the $61,790.00 figure to American Concept for payment 
on the personal contents loss. (Tr. at 29). 
Mr. Laursen told American Concept that this figure was not 
correct and that while the award of $61,790.00 had been signed, 
it was as an accommodation to Lochheads and that the proper 
amount to be paid and the agreed upon appraisal figure was 
actually $53,042.00. (Tr. at 29-30). 
Upon learning of this discrepancy, American Concept 
exercised its statutory right to seek to either vacate the 
$61,790.00 award and redo the appraisal or to modify it to the 
$53,042.26 figure that Mr. Laursen believed to have been the 
agreed upon figure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's summary 
judgment on the basis that they submitted an Affidavit of 
Milton Q. Beck, which they claim raised an issue of fact 
regarding their claim of a breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. Respondent submits that the appeal is without 
merit for the following reasons. 
First, the evidence from trial and the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law established that 
American Concept was informed by its appraiser that the amount 
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of the award that had been submitted to it for payment was 
incorrect. Acting upon this information, it instituted the 
procedure provided by Utah statute to modify or vacate the 
award. In order to prevail on their claim of "bad faith" 
defendants had to prove that plaintiff instituted the action to 
modify or vacate the award without just cause or excuse. The 
facts as established at trial clearly establish that American 
Concept had such justification. 
Second, the Affidavit of Milton Beck fails to create any 
issue of fact. The Affidavit fails to set forth any fact to 
support the conclusion that American Concept failed to satisfy 
its duties of good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore, it 
speaks in the form of legal conclusions, which is not the 
proper subject for expert opinion. Moreover, Mr. Beck does not * 
qualify as a legal expert. 
Finally, appellants submit that they had independent tort 
claims in addition to the claim for breach of the contractual 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. This allegation is 
erroneous, however, as the additional claims for relief stated 
by appellants were simply elements of damage associated with 
the alleged breach and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
supra., clearly establishes that the duty of good faith arises 
in contract and not tort. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMERICAN CONCEPT DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SEEKING VACATION OR 
MODIFICATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
Subsequent to the fire in October, 1983 and the filing of 
this action, the Utah Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra. In Beck, the Court 
held that both the insured and the insurer have an implied and 
parallel obligation to perform the insurance contract in good 
faith. It is the insurer's obligation, the Court stated, to 
"diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine 
whether a claim is valid", to "fairly evaluate the claim", and 
to "thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or 
settling the claim." 
In order to prevail on their claim that American Concept 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by filing a 
Petition to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, the Lochheads 
have the burden to prove that plaintiff instituted the action 
without just cause or excuse. Where a bona fide issue exists 
as to the amount of the award, plaintiff cannot, as a matter of 
law, be found to have proceeded in derogation of its implied 
duty of good faith. 
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Utah law makes provision for the district courts, after 
notice and hearing, to vacate an arbitration award. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31-16 mandates vacation of an award (1) where the 
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were 
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
It is an undisputed fact that Donald Laursen, American 
Concept's appraiser, believed that he had been duped into 
signing an award with which he did not agree. He conveyed this 
fact to American Concept, which acted reasonably in seeking 
either to vacate the award or modify it to the amount which Mr, 
Laursen stated was the stipulated figure. In following this 
procedure, American Concept did no more than it was entitled by 
Utah law. Indeed, having been informed by Mr. Laursen that the 
agreed-upon figure was actually some $9,000.00 less than the 
signed award submitted, it had no reasonable alternative except 
to bring the facts of the arbitration before an independent 
fact-finding body. 
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In Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that a party may challenge an arbitration 
award on the grounds of fraud, corruption, or misbehavior of 
the arbitrators. Even if the award appears valid upon its 
face, the court may modify or vacate it. Twin Lakes Reservoir 
and Canal Company v. Piatt Rogers, Inc., 94 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 
1939). Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court in Mcintosh v. 
Hartford Tire Insurance Company, 78 P.2d 82 (Mont. 1938) has 
held that an appraiser's award may be set aside even where the 
appraiser has no improper motive. Thus, the Court may review 
the method used by the appraiser in reaching his decision, even 
when the award is proper on its face. Mcintosh, 78 P.2d at 
83. An insurance company may deny payment to the insured when 
a good faith controversy exists as to the amount owed. Coe v. 
Security National Insurance Company, 288 Kan. 624, 620 P.2d 
1108, 1113 (1980) . 
While the Utah Supreme Court does not speak directly to 
this issue in Beck it is the uniform holding of courts from 
other jurisdictions that if there is a good-faith controversy 
as to the coverage or the amount thereof, the insurer who 
contests coverage does not, as a matter of law, breach its duty 
of good faith. 
For example, in Pruitt v. Alaska Pacific Assurance Company, 
626 P.2d 528 (Wash. App. 1981), the insured made a claim 
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against his insurer to cover collision damage to a 1972 Ford 
pickup truck. The insurer's adjuster inspected the vehicle and 
felt there was old damage to the truck, which he excluded. The 
insurer and the insured failed to agree on the adjustment of 
the loss; the insured had the entire damage to the truck 
repaired and brought legal action against the insurer. The 
trial court awarded the insured approximately $300.00 less than 
the amount he had expended in repairs and he appealed. On 
appeal, the Court held that there was a bona fide dispute over 
the existence and extent of old damage to the vehicle and, 
under these circumstances, the insurer could not be found to 
have violated its statutory duty to deal fairly with its 
insured even though the adjuster had "doggedly held to his 
original evaluation": 
While it might have been preferable to seek the 
opinion of a second adjuster in light of the dispute, 
Alaska Pacific's total reliance on the single estimate 
of its experienced adjuster . . . was reasonable and 
did not constitute bad faith. 
626 P.2d at 530. 
Similarly, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. 
Cumiskey, 665 P.2d 223 (Mont. 1983), the insurance company 
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it 
was obligated to pay for fire damage to the insured premises 
where the fire investigation revealed that the blaze had been 
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intentionally set by the insured. The insured counterclaimed, 
alleging that the insurer had violated its statutory and common 
law duties to settle the insurance claim in good faith. The 
trial court granted the insurer's motion for directed verdict 
on the bad faith issue, holding that there were legitimate 
questions as to who set the fire, how the fire was started and 
who had the claim. The insurer was, therefore, entitled to 
test the coverage issue in the courts. In upholding the trial 
court, the Montana Supreme Court stated: 
If otherwise appropriate an action for 
declaratory judgment is not precluded by the existence 
of another adequate remedy. . . . In a proper case an 
insurer may use this procedural device in order to 
obtain a determination of the validity, continuance or 
coverage of an insurance policy; a determination of 
the extent of liability; or a determination of the 
insurer's duties under the policy. We hold in this 
case, St. Paul properly filed an action for 
declaratory judgment . . . the district court properly 
directed a verdict on the issue of bad faith. 
665 P.2d 227-228. 
This case is analogous. The issue presented was whether 
the appraisal award had been obtained by fraud, mistake or a 
consideration of inappropriate items in the appraisal process. 
The company reasonably relied on the statements made to it by 
the appraiser that the award which he signed was not wrong. 
The issue was presented to the Court pursuant to the statutory 
procedure provided; the Court found that the appraisal award 
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should be paid as signed, and the award was thereafter paid 
with interest. 
The fact that the District Court decided the vacation/ 
modification issue against American Concept does not change the 
fact that a legitimate dispute existed at the time its Petition 
was filed. In order to establish a claim for bad faith, the 
Lochheads must establish that there was no reasonable basis for 
bringing the petition to modify the arbitration award. Where a 
genuine dispute exists defendants cannot, as a matter of law, 
establish a claim for bad faith. Carter v. Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company, 423 F. Supp. 827 (U.D. Vir. 1976); Noble 
v. National American Life Insurance Company, 624 P.2d 866 
(Ariz. 1981); Armacost v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 644 P.2d 403 (Kan. 1982); Santilli v. State 
Farm Life Insurance Company, 562 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977). 
In this case, the defendants recovered all policy benefits 
from plaintiff to which they were entitled. A legitimate issue 
as to the amount of the arbitration award existed and 
respondent instituted the appropriate procedure established by 
Utah law to resolve the issue. Under these circumstances, 
plaintiff cannot be held to have breached its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
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POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT SET FORTH ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF 
FACT 
It is the appellants' contention that the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment because the Affidavit of Milton 
Beck established a material issue of disputed fact. 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more 
than reflect the affiant's opinion and conclusions. Rather, it 
must set forth specific facts, admissible under the rules of 
evidence, which show that there is a genuine factual issue for 
trial. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The mere 
assertion that an issue of fact exists without proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is 
insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Mr. Beck's affidavit fails to set forth specific 
evidentiary facts indicating the basis for his opinion. Mr. 
Beck simply asserts that he has reviewed some documents and 
believes that plaintiff failed in its good-faith duty. In 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an affidavit which merely reflects the 
affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state 
evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact. 
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In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that there exists a dispute as to a material issue of 
fact, an affidavit must do more than recite legal opinions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that opinion testimony on 
questions of law, other than foreign law, is inadmissible. 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1982). This is 
exactly what Mr. Beck's affidavit purports to do. Rather than 
delineate any factual basis for the claim of the breach of the 
duty of good faith, Mr. Beck simply concludes that "from the 
materials examined it is his opinion as an expert in the field 
that the documented conduct of the plaintiff insurer towards 
defendants as its insured presents abundant evidence of the 
insurer's failure to satisfy its legal duties of good faith and 
fair dealing in the investigation and adjustment of defendants' 
insured loss". The trial court was clearly justified in ruling 
that the Affidavit did not raise a question of material fact. 
See generally, Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United 
Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165, 168 (1970). 
Where there is no dispute as to the facts of the case, but 
rather as to what legal effect those facts have, it is proper 
for the trial court to grant summary judgment based upon its 
own determination of the legal question involved. Larsen v. 
Christiansen, 443 P.2d 402, 403 (Utah 1968). 
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This case clearly is different from the unopposed affidavit 
submitted in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra. In Beck 
the affiant stated that "he had been an insurance adjuster for 
nineteen years and that he had reviewed the settlement 
documentation submitted to Farmers in June when the claim was 
first filed." The affiant expressed the opinion that a 
reasonable and prudent insurance company would have valued the 
claim at between $30,000.00 and $40,000.00 and attempted to 
settle the matter within weeks after the initial offer". The 
Affidavit went on to state further that "the only reason for 
such a substantial delay in settling this claim would be to put 
Mr. Beck in a situation of financial need and stress so that he 
would accept the first settlement offer." Beck, 701 P.2d at 797. 
In contrast, the Affidavit of Mr. Beck submitted in this 
case simply refers to some unidentified correspondence in an 
unidentified "adjuster's file". Mr. Beck states that he has 
read this correspondence and speculates that it reveals a bad 
intent on the part of American Concept. Such testimony is 
neither admissible nor competent and cannot be seen as raising 
an issue of fact. An analogous case is Pace v. Sagebrush Sales 
Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789 (1977), in which the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's affidavit which did not 
allege specific facts to support a counterclaim for fraud, but 
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simply drew general conclusions to the effect that plaintiff's 
misrepresentations were made intentionally and with knowledge 
of their falsity, was insufficient. 
The cases cited by appellants for the proposition that an 
affidavit may defeat a motion for summary judgment are clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's Verified Complaint, which 
controverted facts set forth in an affidavit submitted by 
defendant in support of a motion for summary judgment, was 
sufficient to create an issue of fact. Where the Verified 
Complaint was sufficient to meet the allegations of the 
affidavit, it was unnecessary to submit an affidavit to 
reiterate the sworn testimony of the Complaint. This case 
differs from the case at bar, however, since the Affidavit of 
Mr. Beck does not offer any evidence to contradict the 
testimony of Donald Laursen to the effect that he agreed to a 
different figure and that he advised American Concept that it 
should not pay the amount shown in the signed arbitration 
award. Indeed, Pentecost is supportive of respondent's 
position - that is, that the trial testimony of Mr. Laursen, 
which obviously was admissible, is sufficient to defeat the 
conjectural and conclusory opinion set forth in Mr. Beck's 
Affidavit. 
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Appellants also cite to Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The holding in Holbrook, however, simply 
was that a single affidavit may create an issue of fact. It 
does not speak, however, to the question of whether an 
affidavit sets forth admissible evidence sufficient to raise a 
material issue of fact, which is the issue in this case. 
Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to support 
its Motion for Summary Judgment by proper proof or Affidavit. 
Clearly, respondent's Motion was supported by the trial 
testimony of Donald Laursen upon which it based its Motion, as 
well as the Findings of Fact made by the trial court. The 
trial transcript of Donald Laursen was submitted in support of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and was available to the trial 
court at the time it made its ruling. Mr. Laursen's testimony 
clearly sets forth sufficient facts to establish the reasonable 
basis for plaintiff's filing of the Petition for Modification 
or Vacation. (Tr. pp. 27, 28, 30, 59 and 68). The testimony 
clearly indicates that the appraiser felt that the final figure 
of $61,790.00 was wrong and was not the figure that he had 
agreed upon. Indeed, Pentecost v. Harward, supra, cited by 
appellants in their brief, supplies adequate precedent for the 
fact that the form of the evidence submitted need not 
necessarily be an "affidavit". It need only be in the form of 
sworn, admissible evidence that establishes specific facts. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FAILS TO STATE ANY CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN ADDITION TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF 
THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Appellants' Counterclaim alleges that plaintiff "owed 
defendants duties independent of the written contract of 
insurance to deal fairly and in good faith in the 
investigation, adjustment and payment of defendants' insured 
losses". (Counterclaim 1[9). Clearly, this is wrong, since 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, establishes that the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied covenant in 
the insurance contract. The remainder of the Counterclaim 
simply contains allegations that plaintiff is entitled to 
general and special damages, punitive damages and an award of 
attorneys fees as a result of the alleged breach of the duty of 
good faith. Thus, there were no independent tort actions 
alleged. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence established at the trial on respondent's 
Petition to Modify or Vacate the Aribitration Award clearly 
established that respondent reasonably relied upon the 
information received from its appraiser, Donald Larson, to the 
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effect that the wrong amount had been submitted by Lochheads 
for payment. American Concept acted reasonably upon this 
information and sought vacation or modification of the award. 
The case was tried pursuant to statutory requirement and ruling 
entered. While respondent felt that the trial court applied 
the wrong standard in reviewing the award - that is the court 
held that the American Concept had the burden of proving that 
the award was obtained through fraud - it did not appeal the 
decision, but rather paid the $61,790.00 together with accrued 
interest. 
The Affidavit of Milton Beck does not purport to dispute 
the facts established at trial. Rather, the affiant speaks of 
unidentified documents and facts and purports to testify that 
in his legal opinion there was a breach of the duty of good 
faith and good dealing. The trial court properly held that Mr. 
Beck's Affidavit was comprised of largely inadmissible evidence 
and was insufficient to create a question of ultimate fact on 
whether American Concept had a reasonable basis for instituting 
the petition in the first instance. The trial court's granting 
of summary judgment on this issue is proper and should be 
affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this O day of May, 1987. 
SNO*T\CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
SCMDCF15 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
I 
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